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Executive Summary and Recommendations
This policy paper analyses trends in the growth of the public sector payroll as a function of 
post-2003 dynamics and explores the causes and consequences. It takes a holistic look at 
the public sector in its entirety while focusing on three important ministries – the Ministry of 
Higher Education and Scientific Research; the Ministry of Oil; and the Ministry of Defence. 
The study shows that public sector employment numbers have grown by more than 
three-fold since 2003, with a nine-fold increase in spending on employee compensation, 
leading to burgeoning state budgets that are almost entirely dependent on fluctuating oil 
revenues. After oil prices began to collapse towards the end of 2014, the Iraqi government 
sought to contain the emerging fiscal crisis by adopting austerity measures that included 
a partial hiring freeze within the public sector. But government spending as a percentage 
of GDP continues to be among the highest in the Middle East.
In order to address this problem, the government needs to prioritise areas where exces-
sive and wasteful spending can most easily be curtailed. These are state institutions that 
have poor oversight and are not incorporated into the federal budget, namely the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs).
A prerequisite to limiting opportunities for illicit spending is to enhance transparency and 
oversight, and this is why reforming state-owned enterprises should be prioritised. In line with 
the SOE Good Governance Charter that was approved by the cabinet in 2017, some important 
measures include publishing aggregate reports on financial performance; conducting annual 
third-party independent audits; and enhancing financial accountability by declaring financial 
assistance from the state. An up-to-date breakdown of employment numbers within each 
SOE should also be reported as part of a comprehensive information system that also moni-
tors and records off-budget financing from state-owned banks. Public financial management 
reform will be critical over the coming years to enhance oversight on spending.
Another approach is to address overstaffing by downsizing unproductive state entities in 
order to create space for job creation in productive sectors. According to government doc-
uments, there are some 181,000 employees over the age of 50 and with at least 15 years of 
service that could be offered early retirement, thereby cutting the SOE workforce by over 
one quarter. Vocational training centres also need to be established across the country to 
reskill those who remain on the payroll.
In extreme cases where there is no potential for reform, SOEs should be liquidated. There are 
at least 20 SOEs that fit this criteria, including 5 entities owned by the Ministry of Defence.
Legislation that regulates salaries and wages needs to be revised to ensure that compen-
sation is tightly controlled and that private sector wages can adequately compete. Public 
sector hiring needs to be centralised to root out corruption and ensure that jobs are dis-
tributed based on strategic needs and merit. In this regard, Article 107 of the Constitution 
stipulates the formation of a federal public service council that should have full regulatory 
authority over public sector employment.1
1  Article 107 states: ‘A council named the Federal Public Service Council shall be established and shall 
regulate the affairs of the federal public service, including appointments and promotions, and its forma-
tion and competencies shall be regulated by law.’
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Introduction 
The emergence of a multiethnic and cross-sectarian political elite after the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq has had a deep and long-lasting impact on the nature of the country’s institutional 
structures. The consociational arrangement that developed through the formation of the 
Iraqi Governing Council and the initial years of US occupation sought to enforce ethno-
sectarian representation at every level of state power through a largely informal quota 
system known in Arabic as al-muhasasa al-ta’ifiya. This arrangement, fuelled by aggressive 
competition between leading political actors to capture state resources, combined with 
political pressure to create jobs for a burgeoning youth population, has led to the vast 
expansion of the public sector, subsidized almost entirely by the country’s oil wealth.
By combining a detailed analysis of available payroll data with a series of interviews and 
interactions with senior government officials over a six-month period, the paper broadly 
outlines how patronage networks and clientelism linked to personal loyalties or party alle-
giances are key drivers of growth in the public sector. From the outset, it is worth noting 
the lack of sufficient empirical evidence to substantiate the dynamics between political 
parties and the exercise of patronage through public sector employment. Naturally, these 
practices occur behind closed doors, but additionally, in many cases, a grey zone exists 
between party or political interests, and individual motives. 
But while there is a tendency to focus solely on this angle, it is also important to consider 
the systemic forms of corruption that are a function of a far broader social dynamic linked 
to the demand for public employment at the popular level. Here, it is possible to offer 
realistic solutions to rein in payroll expansion and enable the country to chart a course 
that engenders an economically viable model that can be sustained over the long term.
One of the key lessons from the fiscal crisis that emerged in 2014 is that Iraq’s reliance on 
oil combined with the volatility in oil prices means that the country can no longer afford 
to grow the public wage bill without expecting severe consequences. If it continues to 
spend the vast bulk of its oil income on wages and other operational costs, there is no 
way that the country can divert sufficient resources to rebuilding its infrastructure and 
enhancing much-needed services to its citizens. 
However, even if policymakers embrace this understanding, the government led by Prime 
Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi must address the needs of an estimated 2.5 million unem-
ployed Iraqis who urgently require jobs. With the national unemployment rate at 16 
percent, there is consensus within policymaking circles that the private sector should 
take on a far greater role. But short of securing major foreign investment in the country, 
tackling high levels of youth unemployment – estimated at 36 percent – without further 
expanding the public sector will be extremely difficult in the near term. 
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Payroll Expansion Trends
The wage bill represents the single biggest item of spending from the state treasury. Each 
year, parliament passes a federal budget bill that allocates spending for all government 
ministries and other state agencies. Budgets are divided into recurrent spending, which 
includes salaries for public sector employees and other operational costs; and capital 
spending, representing the investment portion of the budget. Recurrent spending is largely 
determined by the number of budgeted employees, which is outlined in detail within the 
budget law. Employment numbers are broken down for each ministry and government 
agency, so it is possible to measure year-on-year trends by comparing successive federal 
budgets.2
In 2003, public sector employment was estimated at 1.2 million, but by 2015 it had peaked 
to well over 3 million. The growth was largely a function of the country’s increasing oil 
wealth, as oil prices rose and production expanded. Budgetary spending grew uncontrol-
lably – in 2005 recurrent spending was set at around IQD 28 trillion and by 2013 it had 
reached IQD 83 trillion.3 The public sector continued to absorb more people into the 
workforce at higher rates, including not only permanent salaried employees but also hun-
dreds of thousands of contractors and daily wage earners.
Table 1: Budgeted Public Employment Figures from 2011–184
2011 2012 2013 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total 2,662,608 2,750,322 2,907,776 3,027,069 2,905,226 2,885,834 2,885,716
Ministry of 
Defence
306,475 306,614 322,297 362,331 305,000 292,327 288,242
Ministry 
of Higher 
Education
97,439 99,142 102,832 105,864 117,609 116,356 116,160
Ministry 
of Oil5
1,156 1,327 1,793 2,120 2,125 2,125 2,216
2   See author’s analysis in ‘Analysing Growth Trends in Public Sector Employment in Iraq’, Middle East 
Centre Blog, July 2018. Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/07/31/analysing-growth-trends-in-
public-sector-employment-in-iraq/ (accessed 9 August 2019).
3   World Bank, ‘Republic of Iraq Public Expenditure Review: Toward more efficient spending 
for better service delivery’. August 2014. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/611781468253505876/Republic-of-Iraq-Public-expenditure-review-toward-more-efficient-spend-
ing-for-better-service-delivery (accessed 9 August 2019). Note, the Central Bank of Iraq’s official 
exchange rate is 1,182 IQD (Iraqi dinars) to $1.
4   Budgeted public employment numbers, based on author’s analysis of allocations within successive 
annual federal budgets between 2011 and 2018 (figures for 2014 not included as no federal budget was 
passed that year). Note that these figures do not include employment within state-owned enterprises. 
5   Ministry of Oil employment numbers excludes those linked to state-owned companies because they 
are not included within the budget.
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According to the World Bank, government expenditure as a percentage of GDP averaged 
52 percent between 2005 and 2012, making it among the highest in the region. Meanwhile, 
the public wage bill between 2005 and 2010 averaged 31 percent of total expenditure or 
18 percent of GDP.6 Furthermore, salaries radically improved during that period, adding 
an even greater strain on the public treasury, as illustrated in Table 2. In 2004, a new pay 
scale was adopted that resulted in public sector wages becoming four to five times higher 
than private sector wages.7
The contrast between spending on employee compensation between 2005 and today is 
stark. There has been a nine-fold increase, from around $3.8 billion to nearly $36 billion 
over the course of 14 years. For the ministries of defence and higher education, the growth 
rate is even higher than average.
Table 2: Compensation for Employees from 2005–19 (IQD Billion)
2005 2008 2012 2019
Total 4,505 12,695 29,224 43,405
Ministry of 
Defence
589 1,924 3,427 6,647
Ministry of Higher 
Education
243 804 1,818 2,607
Ministry of Oil8 4 10 38 32
The first attempt to curtail the public wage bill came in 2016 when the government 
adopted a partial hiring freeze. Oil prices had crashed in 2014 after the fall of Mosul, and 
a fiscal crisis ensued after the government struggled to fund the war against ISIS while 
also keeping up with salary payments and other operational costs. With the exception of 
a few essential sectors, including health, security services and electricity, new employ-
ment within the government was suspended. As a result, the total number of public sector 
employees within the federal budget fell from 3.03 million in 2015 to 2.89 million in 2018. 
Accordingly, and in line with the government’s commitments to the International Mone-
tary Fund, salaries as a share of overall spending fell slightly from 35.5 percent in 2017 to 
33.4 percent in 2018.9 
There were major cuts in personnel within the Iraqi Security Forces, mainly due to 
retirements and casualties sustained from the war. Also, despite the establishment of 
the Popular Mobilisation Forces (known in Arabic as al-Hashd al-Shaabi), many volun-
6   World Bank, ‘Republic of Iraq Public Expenditure Review’. 
7   Ibid.
8   Ministry of Oil figures do not include compensation for state-owned companies, which make up the 
bulk of the ministry’s spending.
9   Ali Al-Mawlawi, ‘Iraq’s 2018 Federal Budget: Key features and trends’, Al-Bayan Center, March 2018. 
Available at: http://www.bayancenter.org/en/2018/03/1461/ (accessed 9 August 2019).
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teer fighters received only partial salaries from the state during the first two years due to 
budget shortfalls. Compared to 2015, the total number of budgeted personnel within the 
Ministry of Defence fell by 20 percent in 2018. As a result, the impact on recurrent spend-
ing has been noteworthy. Between 2017 and 2018, budgeted spending within the Ministry 
of Defence fell by 15 percent.
Within the higher education ministry, the hiring freeze has not made a significant dent in 
recurrent spending, but the payroll has been reined in, despite great political and public 
pressure to hire new graduates each year. By the end of 2018, the ministry employed 1,500 
less people on a permanent basis than it did in 2016.
As for the Ministry of Oil, the biggest challenge is to understand how many people it 
actually employs in total. The federal budget law only counts those who work directly 
for the ministry, and not the state-owned oil companies, which make up the vast bulk 
of employment within the oil sector. This is because they, along with other state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), are considered self-financing entities and have separate budgets that 
are not subject to the same levels of transparency as other state institutions.
State-Owned Enterprises
With the exception of companies owned by the oil ministry, SOEs represent a major 
burden on the state treasury. The size of that burden is difficult to quantify because infor-
mation on budgetary allocations and employment trends within SOEs are difficult to 
obtain. The vast majority of these entities are largely unprofitable and depend on soft 
loans from state-owned banks (Al-Rasheed and Al-Rafidain) and special grants from the 
government budget in order to cover essential spending including salaries. According to 
the prime minister’s finance advisor, Dr Mudher Salih, SOEs within the manufacturing 
industry alone have accumulated more than $10 billion in debt but contribute less than 1 
percent of GDP.10
As of 2015 there were a total of 176 SOEs nationwide – but several have merged in recent 
years. They belong to one of 14 ministries, primarily the Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Indus-
try and Minerals, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Electricity. Data from 2013 shows 
that only 44 SOEs were profitable at the time, and this number has likely fallen in recent 
years. Estimated employment figures vary greatly but reporting suggests that there were 
633,000 people working for SOEs in 2010, including contractors and daily wage earners.11
Total spending for 136 out of 176 SOEs was estimated at a staggering $31.3 billion in 2013. 
The sharp decline in oil revenues after 2014 led to an 8.4 percent drop in salaried SOE 
10   Mudher Salih, ‘Made in Iraq’, Al-Hewar, 22 November 2018. Available at: http://www.ahewar.org/debat/
show.art.asp?aid=618918 (accessed 9 August 2019).
11   Government of Iraq, ‘Performance and Fiscal Risks from Non-Financial State-Owned Enterprises in 
the Republic of Iraq’, December 2016. Available at: http://www.iraqdatabank.org/storage/app/uploads/
public/5bb/2c8/0d9/5bb2c80d92548465092950.docx (accessed 9 August 2019).
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employees by 2015, while the number of daily wage earners was slashed by 43.4 percent 
over the same period. However, this failed to make a major dent in the wage bill. Although 
overall spending fell by $6 billion, employee compensation declined from $4.5 billion in 
2013 to $4.4 billion in 2015.
Table 3: Employment Trends for 136 State-Owned Enterprises12
2012 2013 2014 2015
Total Salaries and 
Wages (billion USD)
4.1 4.5 4.6 4.4
Total Number of 
Permanent Employees
354,713 366,944 348,122 336,041
Total Number of 
Contractual Employees
33,066 41,463 41,269 43,836
Total Number of Daily 
Wage Earners
31,733 34,187 26,814 19,333
Total Revenues  
(billion USD)
24.9 27.5 26.9 22.0
Total Expenditure 
(billion USD)
27.7 31.3 29.2 25.0
While no SOEs belong to the Ministry of Higher Education, some 24 entities are affiliated 
to either the ministries of defence or oil.
The Ministry of Oil owns 18 companies that account for approximately 140,000 employ-
ees. Of those, some 90,000 are aged over 50 and have more than 15 years of service, 
equating to nearly two-thirds of the total work force. The two leading employers are 
South Oil Company and the Oil Products Distribution Company, both with over 20,000 
employees. There are nearly 10,000 daily wage earners in total, in addition to over 12,000 
contractors. Almost all of these SOEs are profitable, and salaries and wages make up an 
average of 39 percent of total spending.13
Out of the 6 companies belonging to the defence ministry, only one, known as Hamurabi, 
has any degree of productive capacity – manufacturing small arms such as hand pistols. 
Over $800 million has been spent on salaries and wages for over 20,000 employees since 
2003. All 6 companies are unprofitable, lack basic infrastructure and are incapable of 
competing in the market.
12   Figures adapted from Government of Iraq, ‘Performance and Fiscal Risks from Non-Financial State-
Owned Enterprises in the Republic of Iraq’.
13   Prime Minister’s Advisory Council, ‘Restructuring State-Owned Enterprises: Reality and a Vision 
Towards Reform’, February 2015.
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Among the most relevant policy issues that emerged after the 2018 elections relates to 
employment concerns over how to deal with the tens of thousands of contracted wage 
earners that predominantly work for SOEs. Contractors have long complained about 
unfair working conditions, namely the lack of job security and pension schemes. Prior 
to the economic crisis, many contractors were able to secure permanent employment by 
obtaining ministerial approvals to become fully fledged state employees. After the hiring 
freeze was implemented, it became almost impossible for contractors to pursue this 
route. There is now growing public pressure to guarantee salaried employment for tens of 
thousands of contractors.
In early November 2018, the new electricity minister announced that the proposed 2019 
federal budget would guarantee permanent employment for all 33,403 contractors working 
for the Ministry of Electricity.14 The announcement was in reference to Article 11(4b) of 
the proposed 2019 federal budget bill that gave cabinet discretionary powers to offer con-
tractors working for the Ministry of Electricity salaried employment that includes benefits 
such as social security, annual leave and a pension scheme. In February 2019, cabinet 
approved the first tranche of upgraded contracts and by the following month, all 33,000 
contractors had been guaranteed the new benefits.15
From the ministry’s perspective, the move represents an important investment in its 
workforce that will ultimately lead to enhanced power generation and services. But 
there are also legitimate concerns, not only about the financial strain that it will create, 
but also on the precedent that this move sets and its implications for other state insti-
tutions. Of the 24 SOEs affiliated to the Ministry of Electricity, none are profitable. 
They employ over 83,000 people including more than 8,000 daily wage earners. As 
of 2014, these companies had borrowed some $600 million to cover wages and sala-
ries. However, an analysis of the ministry’s approved 2019 budget reveals a 60 percent 
increase in expenditure compared to 2018. Although much of the $8.4 billion budget will 
go towards operating costs that are not related to salaries, it is clear that the ministry 
will need to spend more on payroll expenses.
Since early 2019, contractors from other state agencies including the Ministry of Education 
and the electoral commission have taken to the streets to demand salaried employment. 
This has put pressure on Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi to respond, suggesting publicly that 
he may opt for a middle ground to address the concerns of all the country’s contractors. 
Rather than providing them all with salaried employment, which would not be feasible, he 
has proposed introducing enhanced benefits for contractors such as social security and 
pension schemes.16
14   Luay Al-Khateeb, Twitter post, 2 November 2018. Available at: https://twitter.com/AL_Khatteeb/
status/1058612505692528640 (accessed 9 August 2019). 
15  ‘مئادلا كلاملا ىلع دوقعلا يفظوم تيبثت نلعي ءابرهكلا ريزو’, Ishtar News, 26 February 2019. Available at: http://ishtarnews.
net/news-5530.html (accessed 10 August 2019).
16   Prime Minister’s Weekly Press Briefing, 27 November 2018. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=hXSV3jH_CkA (accessed 9 August 2019).
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Employment and the 2019 Budget Debate
Arguments over the 2019 federal budget offer a window into some of the vested interests 
related to expanding public spending. In November 2018, the newly-formed government 
sent the draft budget bill to parliament for approval. The budget proposed a 27 percent 
increase in overall spending, based on rising oil prices and a healthier post-war fiscal 
climate. For the first time in three years, the government was prepared to grow public 
employment by more than 44,000 people, reaching over 2.9 million in total. Ironically, 
among the biggest increases in spending were in the security services, namely the minis-
tries of defence and interior, and the Hashd al-Shaabi. Although the number of personnel 
would not increase significantly, both recurrent and capital spending would grow by 14 
percent in the Ministry of Interior and 11 percent in the Ministry of Defence. As for the 
Hashd al-Shaabi, a decree by former Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi in the summer of 
2018 ensured that Hashd members would achieve wage parity with other members of the 
security services. For that reason, the Hashd’s overall budget would increase by 20 percent.
During the initial parliamentary session to debate the 2019 budget, Speaker Moham-
med al-Halbusi outlined his key concerns. In his view, even though total spending was 
extremely high, the budget did not adequately address the need for more jobs or increases 
in salaries. Halbusi also questioned the allocation of spending for service provision and 
reconstruction, specifically in liberated provinces. He also noted that there was insuffi-
cient information about the nature of investment spending that would be given to each 
province.17
Halbusi’s point about employment allocations reflected widespread concerns by the 
political class over the insufficient distribution of public sector jobs. Unlike the past four 
years, it was no longer easy for the government to justify maintaining a hiring freeze given 
that oil prices had recovered, and the burden of the cost of war no longer existed. Politi-
cians also seized on popular discontent in an attempt to restore hiring practices that have 
long benefited the political class.
None of the main political blocs, including Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi’s key backers, 
defended the draft budget and there was consensus that a first reading should not proceed 
until the government made significant amendments to the draft law. A joint commit-
tee was established between the parliamentary finance committee and the Ministry of 
Finance to address the concerns of the political blocs and agree on a draft that could be 
put to a vote in parliament. It was not until late January 2019 that parliament eventually 
approved the amended bill, but not before creating an additional 12,000 new public sector 
jobs, which largely went to the Ministry of Health.18
17   Remarks by Speaker Halbusi, 6 November 2018. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-deM-
jxM9cFQ (accessed 9 August 2019).
18   AFP, ‘Iraq parliament approves 2019 budget, one of largest ever’, 24 January 2019. Available at: https://
www.france24.com/en/20190124-iraq-parliament-approves-2019-budget-one-largest-ever (accessed 9 
August 2019).
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Hiring Practices and Patronage
There is no easy way to map out the linkages between political parties and hiring practices 
within the public sector. The dynamics vary from ministry to ministry and are dependent 
on a number of variables. Empirical evidence on how political patronage operates in Iraq 
is particularly sparse given the pervasive culture of impunity. Nevertheless, many of these 
practices are common knowledge because of their widespread nature. For that reason, it 
is possible to outline some of the ways in which the public payroll is utilised by patrons 
and clients.
First, it is important to address some theoretical concepts that are particularly relevant 
to the case of patronage in Iraq. Patronage can be conceived of as a transactional rela-
tionship between patrons and clients. But the literature often distinguishes between 
party patronage and political patronage. In the case of the latter, it is individual politi-
cal leaders rather than the parties they represent that act as the ‘collective’ patron.19 The 
exercise of patronage can occur without knowledge or consent of the individual’s party 
organisation. Furthermore, there are variants of patronage that include clientelism and 
brokerage. Often in the case of Iraq, it is difficult to disentangle these different forms. 
For example, obtaining public employment may or may not involve paying a bribe. For 
individuals seeking employment that have weak political connections, the likelihood of 
paying a bribe is higher. But even the degree to which individuals who receive bribes are 
political varies greatly. In some cases, illegal payments are made to senior-ranking officials 
within a ministry, such as a director-general. In other cases, the transactional relationship 
may be established with a political party that has the power and influence to hire people 
within a ministry. In both scenarios, it is possible that the transaction is purely financial in 
nature, or it extends far deeper into the realm of political cooption.
The three ministries that form the focus of this study are illustrative of this point. Firstly, 
it is not possible to identify a unitary party that has a firm grip over hiring practices within 
the ministries of oil, defence and higher education. This suggests that power is dispersed 
across multiple political and apolitical actors. Furthermore, the ministerial posts have 
changed hands several times, so no single political party has been able to entrench itself to 
the point where these ministries can be considered fiefdoms. This is particularly obvious 
within the Ministry of Higher Education, which has been led by both Sunni and Shia 
parties since 2006. To a similar extent, the Ministry of Oil has been largely run by individ-
uals with weak political bases, with the exception of Adil Abdul-Mahdi, who briefly held 
the position on behalf of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) between 2014 and 
2016. As for the minister of defence, although the position has been traditionally reserved 
for Sunni parties, no single party has been able to exert dominance over the ministry.
19   Petr Kopecky, ‘Political Parties and Patronage in Contemporary Democracies: An Introduction’, April 
2006. Available at: https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/47af1ecf-546f-47f1-beb8-6e9b1b490e61.pdf 
(accessed 9 August 2019).
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Of course, the extent of party patronage is largely dependent on the nature of the party 
in question. Parties with a strong, centralised hierarchy tend to project that strength on 
the ministerial level. A good example is the Sadrist Trend, which was able to dominate 
hiring within the Ministry of Health during the 2006 period when it effectively controlled 
the ministry and recruited party loyalists for junior and senior posts. On the other hand, 
parties with a weakly centralised hierarchy tend to project individual rather than collec-
tive patron-client relationships. In other words, senior ranking individuals within the 
party will engage in clientelist practices out of self-interest rather than at the behest of the 
party itself.
A second distinction is between junior and senior hiring practices. Political parties tend 
to be far more involved in appointments at the senior levels, from directors, advisors 
and deputy ministers. One reason, beyond the obvious importance of the political power 
these positions hold, is that illicit party financing has been historically extracted through 
profiteering from awarding major ministerial contracts, which only senior officials have 
the ability to influence or control. Individuals occupying senior positions can be moved 
elsewhere by a new incoming minister or prime minister, but it is extremely difficult to 
remove them entirely unless they have reached retirement age. In these cases, their fate 
is largely determined by the strength of their political backers. This does not mean that 
hiring practices for junior positions are free from politicisation, but more often than not, 
they are a function of individual practices that involve nepotism and bribery, but could 
also be utilised for electioneering purposes.
Hiring practices exist on a political spectrum – from the employment of card-carrying 
party members on one polar end, to apolitical employees on the other end. Added to 
the dynamic is a mix of nepotism, which may or may not be motivated by political cal-
culations; bribery, as a form of quid pro quo; and merit-based appointments, whereby 
the highest achieving graduates are guaranteed employment in the public sector. Though 
bribery is a key feature of the hiring process, it mainly affects job seekers who have weak 
political connections.
One of the clearest and most widely documented illustrations of this complex dynamic 
involving payroll corruption can be found within the Iraqi Army. During a parliamentary 
session in November 2014, then-Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi claimed that some 50,000 
‘ghost soldiers’ were on the Ministry of Defence’s payroll.20 These are military personnel 
whose salaries are being drawn but are not in military service. Abadi claimed that the figure 
was based on an investigation that he had personally ordered into payroll corruption within 
the armed forces. Although that figure has been disputed by several officials who assert 
that the real number of ghost soldiers was far less, nonetheless, the practice of dispensing 
salaries for individuals who either do not exist (including deceased individuals) or do not 
report to work, is an indisputable phenomenon that extends far beyond the armed forces. 
20   ‘Investigation finds 50,000 “ghost” soldiers in Iraqi army, prime minister says’, Washington Post, 30 
November 2014. Available at: https://goo.gl/gBf1Ap (accessed 9 August 2019).
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Many have attributed the June 2014 collapse of the defence of Mosul in part to endemic 
corruption that existed within the Iraqi Security Forces. The buying and selling of senior 
military ranks was common practice, with bribes being paid in exchange for lucrative 
appointments. In turn, the appointed officers would profiteer by taking a cut from the 
salaries of their subordinates, who were considered ‘ghost soldiers’. While this practice 
has been extensively documented, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which it was 
pervasive across the security sector. However, the effect of such practices was crippling 
to the professionalism and competence of the military command. Many have credited 
Abadi with stamping out this practice at the highest levels, but absenteeism is still an 
issue that exists within the civil service. One of Abadi’s first moves as prime minister was 
to dissolve the office of the Commander-in-Chief and to retire a number of senior military 
officers, since rampant corruption among the officer class was identified as a key issue 
that required tackling.
What is clear from the phenomenon of ghost soldiers is that it involves a complex mix of 
political actors (both party-based and individuals) and apolitical opportunists motivated 
by self-enrichment. Clientelist practices often occur at the individual level, where personal 
monetary gain is sufficient incentive for government officials to engage in corruption. On 
the other hand, brokerage networks do exist, enabling political parties to engage in self-en-
richment through apolitical intermediaries. These interests came to a head in 2016 when 
parliament moved to impeach defence minister Khalid Al-Obeidi. According to Obeidi, 
impeachment proceedings arose in part from his refusal to acquiesce to pressures from 
politicians to hire individuals connected to them. Though charges of corruption were lev-
elled at the minister, it was clear that his removal was primarily motivated by political 
actors whose vested interests had been undermined under Obeidi’s tenure.
Conclusion
Reining in payroll spending requires a combination of political will and technical knowhow. 
If there is enough political will but no alternative avenues for the government to absorb 
rising unemployment, it will be difficult to resist the temptation of growing public sector 
employment even further. Conversely, there are several practical approaches outlined in 
this paper that could be adopted by the government to reduce waste and excessive spend-
ing on the public payroll, but in the current climate of public disquiet over poor services 
and lack of job opportunities, it would take political courage to resist popular demands 
for more public sector jobs.
Any anti-corruption effort adopted by Baghdad needs to focus on limiting opportunities 
for corrupt practices as a priority for the short to medium term. Though accountability 
and prosecution of corrupt individuals is also a vital component, it remains a long-term 
endeavour since overhauling Iraq’s judiciary will take time to achieve.
Prioritising the overhaul of SOEs will also have an added benefit beyond rooting out 
excessive spending. SOEs are notorious for creating monopolies and crowding out private 
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enterprise. By addressing overstaffing issues, many of these entities can be transformed 
into private investment opportunities, thereby stimulating private sector job growth and 
offsetting demands on public employment.
Payroll reform is among the hardest nuts to crack because it undermines the vested inter-
ests of so many political actors and ordinary citizens. The major political blocs that existed 
prior to the 2018 elections have largely fragmented, but it is debatable whether this has 
weakened or indeed strengthened the patronage system given the emergence of smaller, 
more cohesive political parties. The challenge for the government will be to prioritise and 
focus on what is realistically achievable and ensuring that it can effectively communicate 
its plan to the general public in order to illustrate how it will ultimately lead to better job 
prospects and greater economic stability over the long term.
18 Public Payroll Expansion in Iraq
Conflict Research Programme–Iraq Report Series 
Al-Kaisy, Aida, ‘A Fragmented Landscape: Barriers to Independent Media in Iraq’, LSE 
Middle East Centre Report (June 2019).
Al-Khafaji, Hayder, ‘Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces: The Possibilities for Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration’, LSE Middle East Centre Report (November 2019).
Dodge, Toby, Zeynep Kaya, Kyra Luchtenberg, Sarah Mathieu-Comtois, Bahra Saleh, 
Christine van den Toorn, Andrea Turpin-King & Jessica Watkins, ‘Iraq Synthesis Paper: 
Understanding the Drivers of Conflict in Iraq’, LSE Middle East Centre Report (October 2018).
Mansour, Renad, ‘Iraq’s 2018 Government Formation: Unpacking the Friction Between 
Reform and the Status Quo’, LSE Middle East Centre Report (February 2019).
Mansour, Renad, & Christine van den Toorn, ‘The 2018 Iraqi Federal Elections: A Popula-
tion in Transition?’, LSE Middle East Centre Report (July 2018).
Skelton, Mac & Zmkan Ali Saleem, ‘Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries after ISIS: Hetero-
geneous Actors Vying for Influence’, LSE Middle East Centre Report (February 2019).
Watkins, Jessica, ‘Satellite Sectarianisation or Plain Old Partisanship? Inciting Violence in 
the Arab Mainstream Media’, LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series 11 (April 2019).
Causes and Consequences 19 
20 Public Payroll Expansion in Iraq
Middle East Centre
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
@LSEMiddleEast
@lsemiddleeastcentre
lse.middleeast
lse.ac.uk/mec
Middle East
Centre
